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Ever since the Bork hearings, at least, there has been a chorus of dissatisfaction with the
process of appointing and confirming candidates for the Supreme Court, 1 and the Clarence
Thomas hearings have added to the clamor. 2 Yet there seem to be few grounds for hoping that
things will improve, given how conflict-ridden and divisive the process of confirming Supreme
Court Justices has become. The source of the conflict is divided government, with the
Presidency controlled by one party, the Congress by another, and the Supreme Court sought as
an ally by both sides in their struggles. The result is a predictable minuet: the President
promises the voters to appoint Justices with a particular agenda, then solemnly assures the Senate
that there has been no inquiry into a candidate's views. At the confirmation hearings, the Senate
must decide whether to consent to the appointment of a candidate who proclaims an entirely
open mind, and who solemnly refuses to answer any questions regarding controversial cases or
issues. Witnesses and Senators then attempt to exploit the contradiction between these two
approaches, and to discredit the candidate in other ways. The entire enterprise appears to be an
exercise in partisanship, politics, and futility, and few of the participants seem to believe that it is
all that it can be.
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But, according to Senator Joseph Biden, our confirmation process is like democracy-the
worst alternative except for all the others. Is he right? Is the current mess all that we can hope
for, within the confines of the Constitution and representative government?
I think that the answer to this question is "no," and that the path to a better solution is
contained within the language of the Constitution's Appointment Clause itself. The Appointment
Clause provides that the President "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint... judges of the Supreme Court." 3 What does this mean, "by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate," and is it much like what we do now? Not at all. Under our current
system, appointments are made with the "consent" of the Senate, but not, in any formal way,
with its "advice." 4 Yet this makes no sense. The Framers assigned the process of judicial
selection to political branches when they could have accomplished it some other way-say, by
letting the Supreme Court choose its own members-that would have been outside of political
control. Presumably, they gave the political branches this power in order to keep the Court from
drifting too far away from the political and jurisprudential mainstream by providing a political
mechanism for long-term control of the Court's makeup and direction. On the other hand, they
provided for the involvement of both political branches, executive and legislative, presumably in
order to ensure that the process would not be excessively political in a partisan or ideological
sense. This appears to be a carefully crafted approach, and if we are to take the language of the
Constitution seriously, we should think about the possibility of giving the "advice" portion of the
formula equal dignity with the "consent" portion. There must, after all, be some reason for the
Constitution's use of this particular phrase.
As is often the case in matters of constitutional meaning, history is of limited use. According
to the leading work on the appointment process, "[t]he exact meaning of the words nominate and
advice and consent contained in the section on appointments was not discussed in the brief
debate which took place on the provision in the closing days of the Convention." 5 However, we
can draw a few conclusions from the language itself. To begin, it seems likely that the term
"advice" has some meaning distinct from that of "consent." The two terms are not normally
synonyms, and if all that the Framers meant by "advice and consent" was "consent" it would
have been easy enough to have used that word in place of the phrase they chose. But they did
not do that: they said "advice and consent." The meaning of "consent" is pretty obvious. So
what does "advice" mean? Well, advice is normally conceived of as something not binding-we
may give advice freely, but it is a gift that the recipient is not obliged to take. This is what
makes advice different from, say, a command.
3

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2

As Charles Black says, "Procedurally, the stage of 'advice' has been short-circuited." Charles L.
Black, Jr., A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees, 79 YALE L.J. 657,
659 (1970) (emphasis omitted). Unlike Black, I do not take this state of events as a given. For
discussions of the appointment process and how it works in practice, see JOSEPH HARRIS,
THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE (1968); Overview, Judicial Selection, 1
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 270 (1983).
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HARRIS, supra note 4, at 33 (emphasis in original).

Thus, the text provides that the Senate may advise the President on who should be
nominated, but the President should be held under no constitutional duty to follow that advicethough there is perhaps a duty to listen to the advice before nominating anyone. But what kind
of advice? Whatever the term "advice" means, it does not mean "senatorial courtesy":
traditionally, Presidents have paid a good deal of attention to the opinions of Senators of their
own party on the question of judicial appointments, 6 but that cannot be what the appointments
clause envisions. It says "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate," not "by and with
the advice and consent of Senators," much less Senators only of the President's own party. The
language of the text seems pretty plainly to envision some sort of institutional role for the Senate
as a whole, not merely for individual Senators here and there.
If we are to give effect to the advice provision, then, we must create a system that grants the
Senate an institutional role in the selection of nominees, but one that does not bind the
President's hands. Advice is not binding, and a role for the Senate that prevented a President
from choosing the nominee of her choice would be inconsistent with the plain text of the
Constitution. Yet not involving the Senate at all is also inconsistent with the text of the
Constitution. What we have to do is find a way to involve the Senate, in an advisory way, in the
selection of judicial nominees without destroying the President's role in the process.
Doing so shouldn't be hard, and I have a suggestion as to how to go about it, one that I
believe will address many of the political problems accompanying the current confirmation
process while remaining true to the Constitution's text. What I recommend is simple, though it
would be a significant departure from current practice: I propose that the Senate put together its
own list of candidates for each Supreme Court vacancy, and forward that list to the President. 7
This list would constitute the "advice" portion of the Senate's constitutional role. The President
could then do one of two things-she could select a nominee from the list, who would be
presumed competent based on the Senate's earlier screening and would be given approval
according to some sort of accelerated procedure (much as in "fast track" trade legislation), 8 or

Joseph Harris is rather critical of this custom, perhaps with good reason. HARRIS, supra note
4, at 215-37. There is no warrant for it in the text of the Constitution, and it certainly is not
obvious that it has any positive effect on the quality of the nominees.
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It is not vital, in this rather brief and preliminary discussion, to lay out how this should be done.
However, one way to proceed might be for the Senate Judiciary Committee, in closed
proceedings, to consider candidates for a short list, then to make those candidates' names public
for comment by interested parties. The entire list could then go to the Senate floor for approval.
This is not the only way, or even necessarily the best way, for the Senate to proceed, but should
give some flavor of how things might be done.
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That is, the nomination would go directly to the Senate floor for debate and an up-or-down vote
based on the record already in existence (gathered as part of the list-preparation process) without
further hearings, testimony, etc.
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she could select someone not on the list, in which case the confirmation process would take place
as usual.
Under this process both sides would be encouraged not to be too political in their selections:
if the Senate loaded its list with ideologues, the President would ignore it, forcing the Senate to
undergo the traditional confirmation process. On the other hand, the President also would be
encouraged to avoid ideologues and give the Senate's list serious consideration, and to select
from it so long as its candidates were reasonable, in order to escape the agonies of the full-blown
Senate confirmation process as it has become. Furthermore, if the President did not select from
the list, there would be a basis for comparison, as people (and Senators) could decide whether the
President's candidate met the same standards as the members of the Senate's list.
I do not believe that there would be constitutional problems with this approach. The
Constitution's text, after all, specifically provides for advice and consent. And the Constitution
grants Congress broad power to pass all legislation that is "necessary and proper" not only for
executing Congress's own powers, but also for executing "all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof," 9
presumably including the appointment power. Thus, the approach that I have proposed seems
entirely within the powers of Congress as contemplated by the Framers and the text of the
Constitution.
But even this question may not be an issue, as the proposal that I have set out could be
adopted by the Senate, in the form of a rule, without any need for legislation, and without the
President's signature. There is, after all, nothing sacred about the system currently in placehearings, as engaged in now, were not common before this century, and have become a major
part of the process only in the last few decades. 10 Such an approach would probably be immune
from judicial review as a political question, and would at any rate seem well within the
competence of the Senate. 11 The Senate, after all, would not be telling the President what to do,
only announcing the procedures by which it would respond.
One last objection might be that the system I propose would violate the constitutional scheme
of separation of powers. I do not believe that it would. First, it seems to be more consistent with
the text of the Constitution than is the system that we have now, and such a direct textual warrant
should surely overcome concerns based on a concept-separation of powers-that is not mentioned
in the Constitution's text at all but is merely an inference from its overall structure. 12 Second,
9

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
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See generally HARRIS, supra note 4 (describing the evolution of the appointment process).

See generally STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE Rule XXXI (1979) (existing procedure
for judicial nominations); cf. Krebs v. Ashbrook, 275 F. Supp. 111, 118 (D.C. 1967) (House and
Senate Rules are not "Acts of Congress" requiring bicamerality).
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See generally Glenn H. Reynolds, Penumbral Reasoning on the Right, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1992).
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such a system would seem to meet the test announced by the Supreme Court in Morrison v.
Olson, 13 requiring that a congressional action must not "impermissibly undermine" the power of
the Executive Branch nor "disrupt the proper balance between the coordinate branches by
preventing the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions."
No such undermining or disruption could exist. The President would remain entirely free to
proceed in the traditional fashion, with all of its traditional drawbacks; on the other hand, she
would also be free to select someone from a list prepared by the Senate, a list that would
probably be calculated to contain candidates sufficiently moderate to avoid alienating the
President too much. The result, it seems to me, would be a scheme that would avoid the
selection of ideologues and the politicization of the selection process, and that would be more
faithful to the language of the Constitution to boot. It is arguably more faithful to the intent of
the Framers, as well. For while they undoubtedly intended the process of selection and
confirmation by the political branches as a check upon potential judicial tyrants, 14 the Framers
almost certainly did not intend the process to be as heavily politicized and partisan as it has
become.
Having said all this, I am not at all confident that my proposal will be adopted. But if it is
not, that may tell us something important. For notwithstanding all the complaints, 15 it may be
that the process as it now exists suits a lot of people more than they want to admit. Presidents
and presidential candidates are able to promise to appoint ideologues of one stripe or another to
the Court-and, if they can slip the ideologues past the Senate, to fulfill their promises. Senators
are able to posture and curry favor with interest groups on the right and left. And those interest
groups themselves are given a potent tool for currying publicity and raising funds. The result is a
system that provides no gain for the public, but many gains for various special interests. If we do
not depart from the present system, we will know that all the complaints about the process, from
both the executive and the legislative branches, amount to so many crocodile tears.
Though recognizing the fact would require more than a modest change in the selection
process, the Constitution itself provides for a better way of choosing Justices than the way we are
doing it now. If we take its advice provision seriously we can solve the current problems, and
leave the public interest better off. If we do not take the advice provision seriously, then the fault
is not in the Constitution, but in ourselves, and the problem is not process, but politics.
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For more on this, see Glenn H. Reynolds, Sex, Lies and Jurisprudence: Robert Bork,
Griswold, and the Philosophy of Original Understanding, 24 GA. L. REV. 1045, 1099-1103
(1990); see also Glenn Reynolds, Chaos and the Court, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 110, 114 (1991)
(discussing the linkage between appointment process and political affairs).
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